Financial Industry Self-Regulation: Aspiration and Reality by Schwarcz, Steven L.
 (293) 
 
RESPONSE 
 
FINANCIAL INDUSTRY SELF-REGULATION:  
ASPIRATION AND REALITY 
STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ†
In response to Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:  To-
ward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011). 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This essay on financial industry self-regulation responds to Profes-
sor Saule Omarova’s recent article on that topic.1  Omarova believes 
that self-regulation could address two issues better than government 
regulation could:  “the critical role of timely access to market informa-
tion . . . and the need to monitor and manage risk across jurisdictional 
borders.”2  In each case, Omarova’s goal for the self-regulation is to 
prevent systemic risk,3 in contrast to the narrower issues that tradi-
tional self-regulatory organizations focus on—such as “investigating 
suspicious activities in securities trading” and “preventing securities 
fraud and other forms of investor abuse.”4
 
†
Stanley A. Star Professor of Law & Business, Duke University School of Law; 
Founding/Co-Academic Director, Duke Global Capital Markets Center.  I thank Sa-
muel de Villiers for excellent research assistance. 
 
1
Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate:  Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011).  Although her examples sometimes overlap, 
Professor Omarova’s concept of self-regulation appears to be different from private or-
dering, whereby the government delegates powers to private bodies.  See Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 319 (2002) (explaining that private or-
dering has expanded in scope in recent years, both in the United States and abroad). 
2
Omarova, supra note 1, at 418. 
3
Id. at 438. 
4
Id. at 438 n.100 (internal quotations marks omitted).  Omarova indeed  
acknowledges, 
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The key to success for a self-regulatory regime aimed at prevent-
ing systemic risk, Omarova contends, is “to embed financial practices 
in broader social values and regulatory principles” by making market 
participants “more explicitly responsible for the economic and societal 
effects of [their business] activities.”5  This can be achieved, she main-
tains, if the financial industry (by which she appears to mean, as I will in 
this Response, the financial services industry) collectively perceives itself 
as a “community of fate”6—such that each individual actor’s “future 
prosperity depend[s] upon its ability to impose collective self-restraint 
on its members’ profit-seeking activities in the name of public safety.”7
Unfortunately, Omarova observes, there currently is an “absence of 
a ‘community of fate’ mentality within the financial industry,”
 
8 due in 
part to “[the] extraordinary security [the industry enjoys] through its 
access to an extensive public safety net.”9  Although “individual firms 
may not necessarily feel immune to enterprise failure and bankruptcy, 
the modern financial services industry as a whole enjoys a relatively se-
cure existence”10—at least relative to the nuclear power industry, for ex-
ample, which faced an uncertain future after the Three Mile Island 
reactor accident.11
 
[Although] the decades-long experience with self-regulation by stock ex-
changes and securities associations (like the old NASD and its successor, FI-
NRA) has created a deep institutional familiarity with, and built-in acceptance 
of, the self-regulatory model. . . . [T]hat same familiarity may limit the indus-
try’s ability to reconceptualize self-regulation as a broader and significantly 
more demanding system of industry governance aimed at minimizing and 
managing systemic risk, rather than micromanaging the members’ everyday 
conduct of business. 
  This is because “in modern times, national govern-
Id. at 467-68. 
5
Id. at 419 (internal quotations marks omitted). 
6
See id. at 420 (pointing to the nuclear power and chemical manufacturing indus-
tries as existing examples of such communities). 
7
Id. at 443; see also id. at 446 (noting that such a collective perception “has the po-
tential to unify an industry around a common normative framework, an industry mo-
rality, which embodies a more socially responsible and publicly minded approach to 
conducting business”). 
8
Id. at 455. 
9
Id. at 471. 
10
Id. at 468. 
11
Id. 
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ments typically provide a significant public safety net for financial insti-
tutions viewed as crucial to the functioning of their economies.”12
Omarova considers the “crisis of public confidence” and corres-
ponding “political and societal pressure”
 
13 for financial industry 
reform that the recent financial crisis triggered as an opportunity to 
take away the financial industry’s “extensive public safety net,”14 the-
reby creating a “community of fate” mentality.15  To this end, she ar-
gues for the creation of a regulatory separation based on the “nature 
of key risks associated with different types of financial activities.”16  Her 
regulatory proposal would separate “financial firms trading and deal-
ing in OTC [over-the-counter] derivatives and complex financial in-
struments” like structured products (“Tier I” firms) from financial 
firms providing “purely traditional financial intermediation services 
[like lending, deposit-taking, and securities brokerage and underwrit-
ing] aimed at facilitating capital formation.”17
This separation, she maintains, would (among other things) allow 
regulators to better focus on the risky Tier I firms.
 
18
 
12
Id. at 468-69.  Omarova further observes that the recent move toward a higher 
degree of concentration in the post-collapse financial services industry exacerbates this 
problem.  Id. at 470. 
  Regulators could 
prohibit Tier I firms, for example, from taking deposits—a low-cost 
form of borrowing—and thus cause them, she argues, to shrink in 
13
Id. at 451. 
14
Id. at 455.  Omarova admits, however, that the current crisis lacks a “powerful 
symbolism” for reform, such as “an innocent human life lost as a result of an industrial 
accident,” as occurred in the now self-regulating nuclear and chemical industries.  Id. 
at 460.  On this point, she argues that  
[i]n contrast to the nuclear energy and chemical manufacturing industries, 
the key public policy interest that financial regulation seeks to protect does 
not directly implicate human life, health, or physical safety.  The public poli-
cies in the financial services sector aim primarily at protecting the integrity, ef-
ficiency, and stability of capital markets—all fundamentally important but ra-
ther abstract, depersonalized, highly technical, and expertise-driven issues.  
Accordingly, in the absence of a major crisis or scandal, issues of financial 
regulation tend to attract limited public attention. 
Id. at 462. 
15
Id. at 455. 
16
Id. at 475.  Omarova is wary of the popular proposal to redraw lines by regulat-
ing “systemically important institutions under a separate organizational and substantive 
umbrella.”  Id. at 476-77. 
17
Id. at 474; see also id. at 476 (introducing the distinction between “Tier I” and 
“Tier II” firms). 
18
See id. at 477-78 (“[Tier I firms] would be regulated under a single scheme spe-
cifically tailored to address the risks their activities pose to global financial stability.”). 
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size.19  More relevant to her thesis, she contends that government safe-
ty nets should not support Tier I firms because these firms do not pro-
vide traditional financial intermediation services aimed at facilitating 
capital formation.20  Lacking a safety net, Tier I firms would be more 
likely to cohere into a self-regulating community of fate.21
I agree in principle with many points of Professor Omarova’s pro-
vocative article.  For example, the ideal goal of financial industry self-
regulation should indeed be to reduce systemic risk.
 
22  I also agree 
that any self-regulation that has this goal must operate in the shadow 
of government regulation in order to be effective.23  Furthermore, I 
agree that the primary impediment to self-regulation is a lack of in-
centives for financial institutions.24
 
19
Id. at 479.  Omarova’s argument that cutting off access to low-cost deposit-based 
funding will automatically shrink the Tier I financial services market appears inconsis-
tent with the existence of huge investment banks that did not take deposits before the 
financial crisis.  She later seems to tacitly concede this point by admitting that addi-
tional measures may still be necessary to adequately reduce the size of Tier I firms.  See 
id. at 480 n.254 (suggesting that to limit size, “it may also be desirable to subject these 
institutions to significantly higher capital adequacy requirements and impose other 
regulatory limits on their ability to use leverage”). 
 
20
Id. at 480. 
21
Id. at 481. 
22
See id. at 438 (“From a normative perspective, the fundamental rationale for de-
signing a new model of self-regulation in the financial services sector should be the 
monitoring and prevention of systemic risk on a global basis.”). 
23
Compare id. at 416, 445-46 (arguing that a self-regulatory regime requires a gov-
ernment framework to be successful), and Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making 
Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic:  The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 368 (2010) (observing that “[r]esearch has shown that self-
regulatory initiatives tend to fail in the absence of external deterrence pressures like 
the possibility of sanctions”), with Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring:  A 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1019-23 (2000) (arguing 
that sovereign debt negotiations must take place “under the shadow” of United States 
law)..  The sanctions nonetheless should not be so punitive as to “compromise good-
will and actors’ intrinsic and reputational motivations to comply with the law and coo-
perate with regulators.”  Short & Toffel, supra, at 368.  The critical task, however, is 
forming a regulatory framework with a shadow that creates appropriate incentives and 
does not leave a regulatory lacuna.  Cf. Omarova, supra note 1, at 445-46 (emphasizing 
the need for the government to be able to impose rules).  The government clearly should 
not completely withdraw from regulating systemic risk.  See id. at 416 (explicitly not advo-
cating “complete withdrawal of the government from [this] regulatory space”). 
24
See id. at 413, 442, 455 (arguing that the financial services industry lacks the in-
centive to develop socially responsible self-regulation). 
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I.  FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
In order to analyze Omarova’s proposals more closely, however, it 
may be useful to introduce a conceptual framework (hereinafter, the 
“3Cs+TOC framework”) that I have been using in other contexts to 
think about systemic risk and the recent financial crisis.  That crisis, I 
have argued, can be attributed in large part to four types of market 
failures:  conflicts of interest, complacency of market participants, 
complexity of financial markets and the securities traded therein, and 
a type of tragedy of the commons (hereinafter the “TOC failure”) un-
der which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to 
individual market participants—each of whom is motivated to maxim-
ize use of the resource—whereas the costs of exploitation are distri-
buted more widely.25
II.  CREATION OF A SYSTEMIC RISK FUND 
  Two of these market failures—complexity and 
the TOC failure—can help to inform Omarova’s proposals. 
Omarova advocates the creation of “a mandatory system of mutual 
self-insurance”26 among financial firms to encourage these firms to see 
themselves as a “community of fate.”27  This type of approach is, I 
agree, essential to fixing the TOC failure because any resolution of 
this failure requires financial industry participants to internalize their 
externalities.  To this end, Professor Iman Anabtawi of the UCLA 
School of Law and I, as well as others, have been arguing for the crea-
tion of a systemic risk fund to motivate self-monitoring.28
 
25
Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets:  Lessons from the Subprime Mort-
gage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 376, 386 (2008).  Running throughout these 
causes is another cause—cupidity.  Id. at 376.  But because greed is so ingrained in 
human nature and so intertwined with the other causes, cupidity adds little insight 
when viewed separately.  One also might add complicity as a cause, though I have seen 
many allegations but little proof.  
  Omarova’s 
mandatory mutual self-insurance and our systemic risk fund are con-
ceptually identical because both would require systemically important 
26
Omarova, supra note 1, at 474, 481. 
27
Id. 
28
See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:  Towards an 
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 46, 
54), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1735025 (describing the potential use of a 
loss-sharing pool funded by financial institutions).  For a similar proposal, see Jeffrey 
N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis:  Dodd-Frank’s Dangers and 
the Case for a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 154 (2011), 
which argues for a prefunded insurance fund into which all large financial institutions 
would pay premiums.  
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financial market participants to contribute to a common fund which 
would then be used as needed to deter systemic meltdowns.29
I further argue elsewhere that 
 
a systemic risk fund funded by market participants not only can mitigate 
externalities resulting from TOC failure but also can help minimize the 
potential that market participants who believe they are too big to fail will 
engage in risky behavior.  The too-big-to-fail problem [would be mini-
mized because the problem] is effectively an externality imposed on 
government (and ultimately taxpayers) by a market participant engaging 
in such risky behavior.  A privately-funded systemic risk fund would help 
to internalize that externality.  Furthermore, the ability of government to 
require additional contributions to this type of fund should motivate 
contributors to the fund not only to monitor themselves but also to mon-
itor each other to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.  Contri-
butors could be further motivated to monitor by enabling at least a por-
tion of the fund, if unused, to be returned over time and also by 
requiring the fund, if sufficient levels are maintained, to pay a periodic 
rate of return to the contributors.
30
In order to make a systemic risk fund or Omarova’s mandatory mutual 
self-insurance most viable, such a fund or insurance scheme should be 
internationally mandated.
 
31  An international system would help avoid 
anticompetitively “taxing” financial industry participants in any given 
jurisdiction.32
I therefore agree in concept with Omarova’s mandatory mutual self-
insurance proposal, although it should not be used (as she sometimes 
  Omarova’s article does not appear to address that 
point, though I imagine she would readily agree. 
 
29
Compare Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 28 (manuscript at 46, 54) (referring 
to these meltdowns as “risk-spillovers”), with Omarova, supra note 1, at 481 (describing 
the use of a self-insurance fund, “which would be used to provide emergency liquidity 
support to the system in the event of any firm’s failure”).  
30
Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) 
(manuscript at 28-29), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1721606; see also Eric 
Dash, F.D.I.C. Says Banks Lost $3.7 Billion in 2nd Quarter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, at 
B3 (explaining that the government’s deposit-insurance fund rises and falls with the 
success of its contributors).  On the issue of repayment, the fund that the IMF estab-
lished to help bail out defaulting member-nations pays a periodic rate of return to the 
contributing nations.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing, 53 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1195-96 (2004) (noting, however, that repayment is not guar-
anteed).  Unfortunately, the IMF pays those nations less than a market rate of interest 
on their contributions.  Id. at 1196.  
31
Schwarcz, supra note 30, at 27-28. 
32
Id. 
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appears to advocate) as a blanket substitute for the public safety net of 
“government-run deposit insurance and liquidity-backup programs.”33
III.  STANDARDIZATION AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
Further applying the 3Cs+TOC framework outlined above to 
Omarova’s proposals, I take note of her argument that government 
could encourage good self-regulatory behavior by threatening to pro-
hibit financial institutions “from selling or marketing certain types of 
complex financial instruments if the industry fails to monitor and 
manage the risks associated with such products.”34  This argument, of 
course, ties into the problem of complexity.35  One possible response 
to complexity, Professor Anabtawi and I have argued, is standardiza-
tion of financial products.36  Since this response would allow the use of 
complex products so long as they are standardized, it offers a more 
nuanced version of a direct ban on complex financial products.  The 
goal of this response would be to make financial products more cog-
nizable to prospective investors and to reduce the cost to investors of 
familiarizing themselves with the products.37
Anabtawi and I conclude, however, that the overall economic im-
pact of standardization is unclear because it would interfere with the 
ability of parties to achieve efficiencies arising from financial products 
that are tailored to the particular needs of investors, such as products 
that “provid[e] a variety of options relating to risk, return, and timing 
of cash flows.”
 
38  We therefore argue that, to achieve those efficiencies, 
it is “preferable to address complexity through supplemental protec-
tions that do not interfere with the ability of market participants.”39
 
33
Omarova, supra note 
  
To the extent that a threat of banning complex financial products, as 
Omarova advocates—or even worse, an actual ban of those products—
1, at 480.   
34
Id. at 486; see also id. at 475 (calling for the threat of a “direct ban on complex 
financial products”); id. at 431 (referring to “the unprecedented and poorly under-
stood complexity of financial products” as a problem “at the heart of the latest crisis”). 
35
See supra text accompanying note 25 (identifying market failure caused by the 
complexity of financial markets and the securities traded therein, among other factors). 
36
See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 28 (manuscript at 41) (arguing that stan-
dardization of financial products would reduce “information uncertainty”).  
37
See id. (manuscript at 41-42) (explaining that standardization reduces costs of 
learning about new securities). 
38
Id. (manuscript at 42). 
39
Id. at 42; see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 241 (2009) (noting concern for unintended consequences 
caused by standardization—a process that is itself intended to limit uncertainty). 
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would interfere with the ability of market participants to achieve those 
efficiencies, the argument that complexity should be addressed 
through supplemental protections would be even more applicable.  
But Omarova’s proposed threat could be beneficial insofar as it moti-
vates industry participants to improve transparency of financial prod-
ucts, thereby reducing information asymmetry without interfering 
with the ability of market participants to achieve those efficiencies.  
The desirability of Omarova’s proposed threat, though, is indetermi-
nate absent details of its operation and empirical data on its impact. 
Omarova’s goal of facilitating “timely access to market informa-
tion” also appears to tie into the problem of complexity.40  She argues 
that market participants “may be in the best position to identify and 
understand underlying trends in the increasingly complex financial 
markets and to gather and analyze, in real time, information most re-
levant to systemic risk management.”41  Furthermore, market partici-
pants “may have a better ability [than government regulators] to iden-
tify, analyze, and assess systemic implications of underlying trends in 
the financial markets, particularly regarding complex financial prod-
ucts and transactions” and may also be in a position to “make better-
informed judgments as to what information is relevant to issues of sys-
temic risk prevention and how it relates to the broader picture.”42  
Omarova is nonetheless realistic about the possibility that “financial 
institutions, whose profitability depends on their ability to acquire and 
use information not available to their competitors or other market 
participants, are highly unlikely to share proprietary market informa-
tion even with their peers in the industry.”43  Therefore, “the type and 
amount of market information that may—and should—be dis-
closed . . . is a complicated issue that would require careful considera-
tion and balancing of various policy interests.”44
IV.  REGULATORY SEPARATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
 
The central proposal of Omarova’s article ties into the 3Cs+TOC 
framework in a more intricate way.  She advocates a regulatory separa-
 
40
Omarova, supra note 1, at 418; see also id. at 431-34, 491. 
41
Id. at 418. 
42
Id. at 433-34. 
43
Id. at 490-91; see also id. at 489 (observing that “[f]inancial institutions trading 
and dealing in highly complex financial instruments tend to guard their trading in-
formation very closely”). 
44
Id. at 489. 
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tion between Tier I firms on one hand and financial firms providing 
purely traditional financial intermediation services aimed at facilitat-
ing capital formation on the other.45  She argues that such a separa-
tion can advance self-regulation by making it practical to deprive risky 
firms of government safety nets, thereby making those firms more 
likely to cohere into a self-regulating “community of fate.”46  A depri-
vation of safety nets to risky financial firms ties into the 3Cs+TOC 
framework because such a deprivation helps to reduce TOC failure by 
internalizing those firms’ externalities.47  Moreover, the advancement of 
self-regulation ties into the 3Cs+TOC framework because self-regulating 
financial firms are, as Omarova contends, able to reduce complexity.48
Omarova does not appear to fully explore, however, the extent to 
which the advancement of self-regulation might increase the potential 
for conflicts of interest—another factor in the 3Cs+TOC framework—
between financial firms and government.
 
49  Nor does she fully explore 
the extent to which regulatory separation itself could cause negative 
consequences.  She explains that those consequences are beyond her 
article’s scope, even though they can be significant.50
 
45
See supra notes 
  For example, 
separation may create inefficiencies by reducing a financial firm’s 
economy of scope.  Furthermore, because the financial industry is in-
ternational, imposing regulatory separation on a national basis as op-
posed to international basis—as would likely occur from a pragmatic 
16-17 and accompanying text (describing Omarova’s proposal 
for regulatory separation based on the nature of key risks); see also Omarova, supra note 
1, at 477-78.  Omarova emphasizes that her proposed separation would draw the line 
somewhat differently from the separation under the former Glass-Steagall Act, which 
“created barriers between commercial banking and investment banking.”  Id. at 478 
(citing the Banking (Glass-Steagall) Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 12 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (repealed in part in 1999)). 
46
See supra text accompanying notes 15-21 (explaining Omarova’s idea of regula-
tory separation). 
47
See supra text accompanying notes 27-28 (noting how several proposals aimed at 
curbing systemic risk can help fix the TOC failure). 
48
See supra text accompanying notes 40-42 (summarizing Omarova’s views on 
complexity). 
49
See supra text accompanying note 25 (identifying conflicts of interest as the first 
“C” in the 3Cs+TOC framework).  Omarova addresses the conflicts issue in only the 
most general sense.  See Omarova, supra note 1, at 423 (briefly discussing potential crit-
icism of self-regulation, including a concern for conflicts of interest); see also id. at 438-
39 (arguing that the “inherent conflict of interest” would dissipate once the financial 
practices of self-regulation become “embedded” in “broader social values and regula-
tory principles”). 
50
See id. at 479 nn.250-51 (observing that “a reform that redrew regulatory boun-
daries in such a radical manner” may have some “negative consequences”).  
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standpoint—could foster cross-border regulatory-arbitrage incentives51 
and potentially reduce the international competitiveness of firms sub-
ject to the regulation.  Moreover, Omarova does not explore the ex-
tent to which regulatory separation might actually undercut one of 
her two goals for self-regulation:  the need to monitor and manage 
risk across jurisdictional borders.52
CONCLUSION 
 
Omarova’s article therefore may raise more questions than it an-
swers—even questions about whether the consequences of her pro-
posals outweigh her proposals’ benefits.  But perhaps raising ques-
tions is Omarova’s intention.  After all, she explicitly states that 
“[r]ather than advocating [her proposals] as a necessary and compre-
hensive method of regulatory reform, the point of [her] Article is 
merely to discuss its potential impact on the incentives for financial 
institutions to create a regime of embedded self-regulation.”53
 
 
 
 Preferred Citation:  Steven L. Schwarcz, Response, Financial In-
dustry Self-Regulation:  Aspiration and Reality, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PEN-
NUMBRA 293 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/ 
05-2011/Schwarcz.pdf. 
 
 
51
Although Omarova identifies this problem ,and acknowledges “the high proba-
bility of cross-border regulatory arbitrage,” see id. at 487, she incongruously argues 
elsewhere that her proposals should have the goal of reducing regulatory arbitrage.  See 
id. at 416 (“Only by enlisting the industry’s active participation in the regulatory 
process can this vicious circle [of arbitrage] be broken.”); see also id. at 436 (highlight-
ing the potential for arbitrage in today’s market). 
52
Cf. supra text accompanying note 2 (explaining her argument that self-
regulation could address these issues better than government regulation). 
53
Omarova, supra note 1, at 479 n.250. 
